It is well known among British historians that the civil wars of the seven teenth century are fought anew by each generation. A s Veronica Wedg wood wrote over thirty years ago:
tal event brought about by misunderstanding, mistrust and even paranoia; 2 and it left traditional society and even the constitution at the end of the seventeenth century much as they were at its beginning. 3 The years of Margaret Thatcher's government have seen an intensifica tion and politicization of this conflict. The approach of several anti-Marxist historians, publicized in the national press, starts from the assertion that the study of history in Britain has for too long been dominated by Marxist orthodoxy, foisted on to the academic world by an organized conspiracy of Communist Party members and ex-members. 4 (Speaking from personal experience of British academic life over thirty years, I cannot remember a time when the Marxist view of the civil was was ever established as the dominant view -it has always been vigorously combatted by leading aca demics with wide influence, from Trevor-Roper and Stone in the 1960s through Conrad Russell and Alan Everitt in the 1970s to John Morrill and Anthony Fletcher in the 1980s.) It is time, they say, to banish these grand theories of sinister origin in favour of a pragmatic approach based on such profound generalizations as "Conflict, as has been said elsewhere, is a common enough form of social interaction", or "All elements in society are subject to continual change, decay and renovation."
5
At the heart of the Marxist "Old Guard" coming so heavily under fire from the Thatcherite right stands Christopher Hill, long regarded by both left and right as Britain's leading Marxist historian. Though Hill left the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1957 and has apparently belonged to no political organisation since then, has had a conventional and successful academic career including the mastership of one of Oxford's most presti gious colleges, and has founded no distinctive group of Marxist followers, 6 he infuriates the right, the revisionists and the pragmatists. Perhaps it is because, as one of his most intemperate critics remarked in 1984, he simply will not admit defeat, despite having undergone a level of "assault upon his historical method, his historiographical achievement, and his intellectual integrity that would have stilled most other scholars".
It is therefore particularly valuable and interesting to have these three volumes of essays by Hill published now. For this collection is far from being the warmed-up dish of reprints and outdated ephemera so often served up as "Collected Essays" towards the end of a distinguished academ ic's career. Though they include material from as far back as 1958 (an essay on Cromwell which has stood the test of time remarkably well), most of the pieces reprinted here are recent responses to revisionist arguments, some with new passages or postscripts and almost all with carefully updated footnotes. Some are rewritten, often from a series of book reviews (on the works of Patrick Collinson and Fernand Braudel, for example). All three volumes show that Christopher Hill has continued to respond, to develop his ideas and to open up new perspectives on history long after his shallower critics have left the field mistakenly supposing themselves to have won some kind of victory.
In these Collected Essays, Hill defends his basic Marxist interpretation of the English Revolution vigorously and competently. There was a real revolutionary transformation of England in the mid-seventeenth centuryeconomic, social, political and cultural -which could not have happened without the civil war and the abolition of monarchy (1,319-334; III, 94-124). The war and its outcome were no accident, no irrational disaster or product of misunderstanding and obstinacy, but the result of real conflicts of social forces and the ideas which reflected them, and these had been developing for decades (1,3-31; II, 19-86; III, 21-67). The course of the conflict and its results were determined by a complex interplay of classes and ideas: the gentry with their hostility to absolutism and preference for local indepen dence; the "middling sort" of property owners with their desire for econ omic freedom coupled with a strong fear of disorder arising from below; the artisans and peasants to whom radical religion and politics made their strongest appeal; and the propertyless poor, excluded from almost every one's definition of "the people" but seen as the solution rather than merely a problem by Gerrard Winstanley the Digger (III, 21-67,94-124,247-273). The significance of the radicals is shown again and again to have been the pressure they put on moderate revolutionaries and would-be reformers to make up their minds what they wanted and within what limits they were willing to act; to define and redefine liberty, salvation, and popular sover eignty; to ensure that England had a revolution and a capitalist, imperialist future rather than an indefinite absolutist stalemate or a Prussian-style transformation from above (II, 117-161, 321-342; III, 21-67, 94-124). Hill also examines the social and political implications of predestination and free will with a sharp eye for paradoxes and social divisions; at one point he describes the popularity of doctrines of universal salvation or "rustic Pelagianism" among lower-class sectarians as a demand for the democratization of salvation (II, 131). He examines the perennial problem of antinomianism within the Protestant tradition, and shows how, with "covenant theology" the English Calvinists attempted to have it both ways, God's absolute decrees being offset by his covenant guaranteeing salvation to his elect in return for their faithfulness (III, 300-324). In the longest piece reprinted here, Hill shows how inseparable religion was from revolution in this world in the thought of Gerrard Winstanley, ably replying to those who have argued that Winstanley was a mystic taking purely symbolic action (II, 185-252).
This whole volume justifies very thoroughly Hill's opening warning against "isolating 'religion' as a self-sufficient factor unrelated to thisworldly concerns", and illustrates in innumerable ways his statement that '"putting religion first' might mean many things which are not 'religious' in the modern sense". (II, vii, 57) By comparison, Jonathan Clark's call for "renewed attention to religion as religion rather than as a sublimation of something else" looks both shallow and sterile. Hill's readiness to incorporate new ideas into his vision of the seven teenth-century revolution is shown in the remarkable essay, "Science and Magic" (III, 274-299). The part played in the emergence of modern science by ideas which are to a modern scientific mind irrational, such as Hermeticism, was already hinted at in Hill's Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution in 1965. But in trying to prove that there was a particular association between natural magic and religious or political radicalism and that this was a factor in the eventual rejection of magic and emergence of modern science, Hill overreaches himself and falls into manifest contradic tions and absurdities. (Among these is the assertion that mortalism, as held by Milton, made it difficult to accept the existence of spirits; the poet who could discuss at some length whether angels experience physical love does not seem to have found it insuperably difficult!) Despite Hill's competent defence of the Marxist analysis of the English revolution, his effective critique of opponents and his capacity for new and valuable insights, he has many weaknesses. These are perhaps most irrita ting to his supporters, for they make it difficult at times to defend him. Most interestingly, however, Hill's weaknesses have changed over the years, as he has grown away from the mechanical, Stalinist Marxism that dominated his 1940 essay The English Revolution, 1640 (not reprinted here) and was still visible as late as God's Englishman (1970). Unfortunately, what he has moved towards sometimes seems to be woolliness and eclecticism.
One of the most interesting pieces in this collection is "A Bourgeois
Revolution?", a major interpretive essay first published in 1980 but here brought up to date with new passages, references and a postscript (III, 94-124). In this, Hill seems at first sight to be taking an extremely mechan ical position, insisting that the term "bourgeois revolution [. . .] in Marxist usage does not mean a revolution made or consciously willed by the bour geoisie", and that "it was the structures, fractures and pressures of the society, rather than the wishes of leaders, which dictated the outbreak of revolution and shaped the state which emerged from it". (Ill, 95-96) He goes on to claim that "No Marxist to my knowledge has ever suggested that the ideas of individual men and women are determined by their class origins or class interests", and restates his position as, "At all points, then, I wish to disclaim the imputation of conscious will." (Ill, 97,113) These would seem to be rather extreme statements of the view that history moves by imperson al forces rather than human action. Yet he shows quite dramatically, in the rest of this essay and elsewhere, that the development and outcome of the revolution were very much the product of human action, above all the interaction between large and small property owners, inspired by ideas which he is very far from ignoring in the rest of these three volumes.
In Marxist terms, the relationship between consciousness and reality in a bourgeois revolution is not transparent -if it was, there would have been no need for Marx to argue that a bourgeois revolution was what had taken place in England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and what was happening in the Germany of his own time. Of necessity, the bourgeoisie appears in the realm of ideas as the embodiment of liberty, reason, godliness, the general will or some other universal principle; in political action it fights for its own interests both against feudal absolutism and against the possibility of more radical revolt from below. There should be no difficulty for Hill in saying that the English Revolution was made by the bourgeoisie, though in alliance with other classes. "A Bourgeois Revolution?" is also one of the many essays in which Hill uses the term "natural rulers" (or '"natural rulers'" -he is never quite sure whether it needs inverted commas) to refer to the gentry and merchant oligarchies of seventeenth-century England. But if the Restoration of 1660 was, as he claims, a return to power of these "natural rulers" who had faced and fought the threat of being ousted by absolutism, and the events of 1688-89 further confirmed their power, then in what sense was there a revolution? As fast as Hill tries to justify the term, the more he seems to get into a muddle. At one point he refers to the existence of a "rural bour geoisie" of gentry and yeomen participating in production for the market from the sixteenth century onwards (III, 97). At another, the gentry was transformed by a "breakdown of traditional patriarchal relations between landlord and tenant"during the revolutionary decades (III, 103). After 1688, "the peerage was sociologically a very different class from the hang ers-on of James I's court" -whatever "sociologically" may mean in this context -and he claims that Marx recognized that at some point "the English gentry became a bourgeoisie of its own particular kind" (III, 105, 112).
It would be quite possible for a Marxist to resolve this dilemma -was it or was it not the same class which ruled after the Revolution as before? -by looking at the changing economic base of the English gentry as landlords from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, rather than supposing that participation in production turned them into a rural bourgeoisie. Most historians are agreed that there was a massive shift in the source of land lords' rent income in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, from late feudal copyhold to market-based leasehold rents.
1 1 This meant that production was increasingly being carried on by yeomen farmers hiring labour and producing for the market instead of by subsistence peasants. 1 2 It would be appropriate to call these capitalist farmers a rural bourgeoisie. The landlords were not usually active capitalists themselves, but they were increasingly dependent as rentiers on the existence of rural capitalism. Ironically, it is in another essay in the same volume, a fairly lightweight piece of journalism written for the centenary of Marx's death, that Hill quotes Marx on the English landowning class, which always lands on its feet -thanks to the capital invested by other people in the soil, whereby the landlord collects a rent which stands in no proportion to the profits to be drawn out of the soil by the capitalist. There are other conclusions in these essays with which I suspect few Marxists would agree. One is that a socialist transformation of society was more possible in Gerrard Winstanley's day than ours (II, 235, 339 ). An other is his suggestion that disputes over the history of the family may be resolved by supposing "continuity of lower-class attitudes towards the relation of the sexes, whose evolution is quite distinct from that of their betters". (Ill, 202) The problem with this is that it is uncomfortably close to the view of the fashionable right wing as expounded by Ferdinand Mount.
If Hill, despite his many strengths, sometimes falls into confusion or avoids carrying his Marxist analysis to appropriately serious conclusions, it is partly a reflection of the weakness of Marxist history in Britain today. This is not to say that Hill does not have his supporters -he has, fortunately for historical education in Thatcher's Britain, very many. But few of them are Marxists, and some take special pride in the fact that they are not; William Lamont recently claimed that "it is Hill's particular glory not to have established a recognisable school". 
